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Innovation or Confrontation
Alternative Directions for American Industrial Relations
Thomas A. Kochan 




The first half of the 1980s witnessed joint experimentation and ex 
tensive innovation with new forms of labor-management relations. In 
our earlier work (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986) we interpret both 
tendencies as signals that many of the principles of what we term the 
New Deal industrial relations system are no longer well-suited to the 
contemporary environment or to the interests of workers, employers, 
or the broader society. In that work we used a three-tier model to describe 
both the key principles in the New Deal industrial relations system and 
the efforts of labor-management to move to a new system. The focal 
point of the New Deal system was the middle tier, i.e., the level at 
which unions and employers negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
over wages, hours, and working conditions. The key to the success of 
this model was that collective bargaining "took wages out of competi 
tion." At the top tier of the system, the governing principle was that 
it was management's sole job or prerogative to manage the enterprise; 
unions and workers were to negotiate over the impacts of strategic 
management decisions if these decisions affected wages, hours, or work 
ing conditions. At the bottom tier, the workplace, the collective bargain 
ing agreement specified in detail worker rights and obligations and pro 
vided workers a voice in day-to-day administration through the grievance 
procedure. As we will see, the innovations under way in the 1980s 
challenge each of these New Deal principles and practices.
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At the workplace, for example, efforts are under way in many set 
tings to introduce more employee participation and greater flexibility 
in the organization of work and utilization of people. At the level of 
collective bargaining, negotiations continue to play an important role. 
The inability of unions to take wages out of competition by standardiz 
ing wages and benefits across the product market, however, has forced 
the parties to give greater attention to employment issues and in some 
cases to experiment with new wage criteria and formulas that link wage 
increases to more firm-specific performance. Innovations under way 
at the level of strategic decisionmaking stand in direct contrast with the 
New Deal principles regarding managerial prerogatives. In a limited 
number of settings, management and union leaders are experimenting 
with different ways to involve union leaders earlier and more deeply 
in decisions that heretofore would have been the sole province of 
management.
Some innovative developments in industrial relations have proven 
fragile. In part, this is because the early 1980s have also been a period 
of increasing crisis and bitter conflict between labor and management 
in American society. While strikes were less frequent in the 1980s than 
in previous years since World War n, those that did occur were fre 
quently hard-fought struggles for survival, rather than tactical exten 
sions of the collective bargaining process. More than 40 percent of union 
members covered under major collective bargaining agreements ex 
perienced wage cuts or one or more years of no wage increase between 
1980 and 1984. Many others experienced significant losses in real wages 
and decreases in coverage or benefit levels in medical insurance or other 
fringe benefit areas. Moreover, the long-term decline in the rate of union 
membership accelerated during the early 1980s. This was partly a reflec 
tion of overall employment declines in the sectors of the economy where 
union membership is highest, but it was also the result of greater and 
more open employer opposition to union representation in newly open 
ed facilities (Dickens and Leonard 1985; Farber 1985). The early 1980s 
were also characterized by an increasing polarization in the relation 
ships between the labor movement and government policy makers. Union 
representatives' frustrations in organizing and representing workers in
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the context of existing collective bargaining policies and procedures were 
heightened by a sense of powerlessness to modify these policies.
The central question underlying the research summarized in this paper 
is whether the innovations and experiments in labor-management rela 
tions will diffuse to a broader array of bargaining relationships and 
become institutionalized as regular aspects of labor-management rela 
tions. Or alternatively, will they be aborted by the broader conflicts 
between labor and management or between labor and government 
policymakers over union representation and organization rights, or over 
the very role of unions in society?
To address this issue, we will draw on a study of innovations in a 
panel of nine companies and more than a dozen associated local and 
international unions. These parties participated in a two-year study con 
ducted by members of our research team with the support of the U.S. 
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and 
Cooperative Programs. These cases were selected because in each the 
parties had initiated one or more of the types of innovations that we 
believed challenged prevailing principles of the New Deal system. As 
such, these are neither representative nor random samples from the 
universe of contemporary collective bargaining relationships. Instead, 
they are illustrative examples of the different avenues through which 
labor and management can change their bargaining relationships in ways 
that substantially depart from the traditional New Deal model.
Our sites and the nature of changes occurring in each are outlined 
below and classified in Exhibit 1 within the three-tiered framework we 
use for analyzing contemporary employment relationships.
The United Automobile Workers Union (UAW) 
and General Motors (GM)
Our focus in this case was on the new Fiero and Lake Orion 
assembly plants, both of which feature a fundamental reoganiza- 
tion of work design. The roles of labor and management have been 
significantly modified to afford employees greater autonomy, less 
supervision, and, in the case of Fiero, union representation in all 
plant-level strategic and administrative decisions. During our 
research, the joint design and creation of the Saturn Corporation
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was also solidified and the GM plant in Fremont, California, was 
reopened (after a two-year shutdown) as a joint venture with 
Toyota. We followed some aspects of both of these developments 
as well.
The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) 
and Xerox
The seven plants in Xerox's home manufacturing complex (near 
Rochester, New York) show how narrowly focused quality circles 
can evolve to encompass multiple forms of employee participa 
tion and innovation in the organization of work, all of which is 
reinforced via contractual language including a no-layoff guarantee, 
joint decisionmaking regarding outsourcing, and gain-sharing. Fur 
ther, the parties have built on a history of informal consultation 
about strategic issues with the establishment of joint "horizon" 
planning committees on human resource management and other 
issues, the joint design of a new manufacturing facility, and union 
involvement in new product development.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the International Brother 
hood of Teamsters (IBT), the Association of Flight Attendants 
(ATA), and the Air Transport Employees (ATE) Western Airlines
A financial crisis brought on by industry deregulation led Western 
to pose concession demands to all four unions. Though each of 
the negotiations was different, all four unions ultimately emerged 
with significant minority stock ownership for the members, a seat 
on the board of directors, and, in one case, an agreement to pur 
sue greater employee participation in daily decisions. Of particular 
interest is the great variation in the strategies selected by the four 
unions.
The International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the 
Boeing Corporation
Rapid advances in manufacturing technology led the union to push 
for joint roles in the exploration, selection, and implementation 
of new technology. The operation of the joint structure that evolved
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over the course of two contract cycles in Boeing's Seattle, 
Washington facility and a parallel quality circle effort were the 
focus of this research.
The Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers Union (ABGWU) and 
Alcoa
A rolling mill, in a highly competitive portion of the aluminum 
industry, was the setting in which these parties attempted to guide 
employee involvement activities and work reorganization through 
a period of major wage and benefit concessions. The concessions 
also reflect decentralization of bargaining in the industry. We ex 
plore the consequences within the local union and in a range of 
joint activities.
The United Automobile Workers (UAW) and the Budd Company
These parties have sought to sustain employee involvement in 
itiatives, limited just-in-time delivery, and quality control im 
provements. These changes have been prompted by customer 
pressure in the context of the highly competitive auto supply in 
dustry. During our research, efforts were initiated to link plant- 
level participative activities to cooperation at the corporate/inter 
national union level. Also, one local negotiated an agreement to 
accept significant work rule changes and the use of a team con 
cept approach to work organization in return for reinvestment in 
its facilities.
The Diesel Workers Union (DWU) and the Office and Clerical 
Unit (OCU) and Cummins Engine
After nearly a decade of experimentation with the design of non 
union facilities based on socio-technical principles, the parties are 
now trying to integrate these innovations into the company's 
unionized home manufacturing complex. We have followed the 
diffusion of new systems for the organization of work, as well 
as related changes in collective bargaining as they have evolved 
during a period of layoffs and management turnover at the cor 
porate level.
32 Innovation or Confrontation
The Paperworkers Union and Boise Cascade Corporation
Two decades of low performance in the company's newest and 
largest facility, partly connected with an increasingly complex set 
of work rules, led to company bargaining demands for a sweep 
ing revision of the contract and hundreds of attached memoran 
dums of agreement. After a lengthy strike, the company prevail 
ed, and imposed a contract with only four job classifications, a 
team-based, flexible work organization, a no-lay off pledge covering 
current employees and substantial wage increases for those affected 
by the job classification changes. Critical questions in this case 
concern the implementation and evolution of such changes when 
they are imposed by hard bargaining.
The United Rubber Workers Union (URW) and Goodyear 
Corporation
Gradually, over about 10 years, the parties have made a series 
of incremental changes in the organization of work and the struc 
ture of union-management relations in their Lincoln, Nebraska 
facility. We were interested in the process and results of these 
changes.
Longitudinal case studies were conducted for each site by one or more 
members of our research team. Interviews ranging in number from 15 
to over 100 were conducted in each case. In some of the cases, we were 
also able to draw on previous case studies or related research emerging 
from our earlier work. Employee surveys were conducted in three cases 
(Western, Boeing, and Xerox). In one case (Boise Cascade), we were 
able to conduct a formal economic analysis of the effects of the changes 
introduced.
The Processes of Institutionalization and Diffusion
The concept of institutionalization has a long history within the 
behavioral sciences. It rests, in part, on Kurt Lewin's (1948) seminal 
studies of social change, which positioned institutionalization as the end 
point of a multistaged change process. The first stage of the process
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is often referred to as the process of "unfreezing" current organiza 
tional practices. Stimulating or motivating change is usually some crisis 
or set of severe external pressures. The second phase of the change 
process normally involves implementing a set of experimental or 
demonstration projects. The focus at this stage is on the factors that 
lead to and then maintain the parties' commitments to the proposed 
changes, and also on the evaluation of initial results. The third phase 
is the institutionalization phase, viz., the process by which changes are 
integrated into ongoing practices within the organization. This can be 
thought of as a refreezing process, though one of our conclusions is 
that this final institutionalizing stage is best thought of as dynamic, rather 
than static in nature.
We will focus on the second and third stages of this model and ex 
amine the management and union strategies and actions that affect the 
institutionalization process. While we recognize that developments in 
the external environment also have important effects on the course of 
these innovations, we have discussed the importance of these external 
factors elsewhere (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). Our goal here 
is to elaborate more fully on the internal dynamics of these processes.
We define institutionalization as the dynamic process by which daily 
practices and decisionmaking at the workplace, collective bargaining, 
and strategic levels of industrial relations are linked so as to respond 
to the environment confronting the parties and their independent needs. 
We believe that achieving this type of effective linkage in today's en 
vironment requires fundamental transformations in practices across all 
these levels of industrial relations activity. In this paper, we focus on 
the following specific practices: employee participation, flexible forms 
of work organization, participation in new technology decisions, and 
participation in strategic management decisions. We see these as cen 
tral features of what might be thought of as a new industrial relations 
system more responsive to the demands of the environment and the needs 
of the parties. At the same time, however, we don't claim that these 
exhaust the range of innovations under way in American industrial rela 
tions or that they constitute the sole characteristics of any new system.
Finally, we are interested not only in the conditions under which these 
changes permanently transform a given labor-management relationship,
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but also in how widely these innovations will be diffused throughout 
a given organization and across North American industry. A final sec 
tion of this paper will therefore discuss the prospects for the wider dif 
fusion of these changes.
Employee Participation Processes
By far the most frequent innovation initiated in industrial relations 
hi the early 1980s was some form of employee participation. Some type 
of QWL or similar participation effort was initiated in eight of the nine 
cases in our panel. Many of these efforts came to be tied to work 
organization changes and technological change, which are discussed 
in greater detail in the following sections of this paper. The focus here 
is just on participation.
An examination of the evolution of these various processes indicates 
that in no case has it diffused smoothly over time to a point where a 
large majority of employees are now actively participating in QWL prob- 
lemsolving teams. On the other hand, it has been completely abandon 
ed only in one case. Typically, the parties experienced an initial period 
of growth and enthusiasm, followed by what appears retrospectively 
as a predictable crisis. This crisis was usually characterized by a decline 
in further employee volunteers to participate in the process, resistance 
by middle and lower managers, and opposition by some union leaders, 
all of which is often prompted by developments in other aspects of the 
management organization, the union organization, and the collective 
bargaining relationship. Thus, the resulting plateau in the growth of 
the QWL initiative raised fundamental questions about the extent to which 
it could or should affect the economic interests of the firm, the 
employees, and the union. The parties were then forced to choose 
whether to reinforce or abandon the effort.
Because of the relatively modest costs of initiating QWL processes, 
we have concluded they can serve as useful starting points for building 
trust and exposing employees, supervisors, managers, and union leaders 
to participative methods of interaction and joint decisionmaking. 
However, it is increasingly clear that they cannot remain in this narrowly-
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focused, adjunct mode. Where the parties have recognized this, what 
started out as a narrowly-focused QWL process became a catalyst for 
participative problemsolving methods in a wide variety of areas involving 
work organization, the introduction of new technology, strategic plan 
ning, and planning for new facilities.
This transition is politically difficult, however, since the broader the 
scope of issues addressed in a participative mode, the more likely the 
process is to touch on issues covered in the collective bargaining con 
tract or other areas of management decisionmaking usually designated 
as off-limits to the QWL process. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
many QWL processes never make this transition. Yet, standing alone, 
the narrow forms of QWL are not likely to make a sufficient contribu 
tion to the competitive strategies and objectives of the firm, or to the 
economic and social interests of workers and the union, to sustain 
widespread support.
The key determinant of whether or not the transition to larger aspects 
of the relationship is made successfully appears to be the willingness 
of top-level management and union leaders to assert their commitment 
to the principles of problemsolving and participation in the face of new, 
potentially contentious situations. By doing so, they can transform what 
was an incremental program for diffusing QWL teams into a set of prin 
ciples to be applied to a range of crises or opportunities that might benefit 
by problemsolving processes.
Work Organization Reforms
During the first half of this decade many employers pressed hard to 
increase flexibility in work rules and in the organization of work. In 
a broader survey, Cappelli and McKersie (1987) note that in the majori 
ty of cases, management pressed for work rule changes primarily so 
as to reduce costs by shedding labor. In some cases, however, the goal 
was also to introduce new concepts of work organization. This was 
especially true where (1) the economic and technological environments 
facing the parties have changed in significant ways; (2) an alternative 
model of work organization was available to the parties to draw on (often
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from elsewhere within the firm); and (3) new employment security pro 
visions were used to gain acceptance of the changes.
Employer interest in new forms of work organization arose out of 
a desire to tap the motivational advantages usually associated with broad 
task designs (Hackman and Oldham 1980) and the need to overcome 
the rigidities and high costs associated with traditional work structures 
and rules. In addition, new technology that promises increased flex 
ibility in production requires, for its optimal performance, equally flex 
ible human resource management systems and work organization ar 
rangements (Shimada and MacDuffie 1987). Thus a concept that first 
gained favor among behavioral scientists as a means for increasing 
motivation and job satisfaction through broader job designs (Hulin and 
Blood 1968; Turner and Lawrence 1965; Walton 1980) has now gain 
ed the support of many line managers because of its strategic impor 
tance in lowering costs, increasing quality, enhancing adaptability, and 
achieving full utilization of new technology.
In our panel, we observed all nine firms either implementing changes 
in work rules and new work organization design principles, or plan 
ning or attempting to implement these concepts for selected operations. 
Two firms (GM and Xerox) used these concepts in designing new 
facilities; four firms (Xerox, Boeing, Western, and Boise Cascade) 
negotiated work rule changes in collective bargaining; four firms (Alcoa, 
Cummins, GM, and Xerox) used problemsolving principles and pro 
cesses to introduce these concepts into selected work units within ex 
isting facilities; and two firms (Boeing and Budd) were in the process 
of discussing the introduction of flexible work systems on a selected 
basis at the time our case studies ended.
New Facilities
By far, the most successful introduction of flexible work organiza 
tion concepts has been in new or "greenfield" worksites. This is hard 
ly surprising, since at a new site a new workforce can often be selected 
based on the ability and desire to work within flexible or teamwork 
systems. In the 1970s, most of the plants that opened on this basis were 
(and still are) nonunion. More recently we have seen a number of new 
or completely refurbished unionized plants using flexible work systems.
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Several examples from our panel sites illustrate the use of these con 
cepts in the unionized worksites.
GM. Consider the way self-selection, even in a unionized setting, 
contributed to the different experiences of GM's Pontiac Fiero and 
Lake Orion plants. Both were new or completely remodeled and 
retooled facilities, and the human resource management strategy 
for each was based on the team concept, or, as GM calls it, the 
"operating team" concept. Workers from both plants came largely 
from a Fisher Body GM plant that had been closed and was later 
refurbished (retooled) to form the Fiero assembly plant. The 
workers were told prior to choosing to stay at the Fiero site that 
the plant was designed around a teamwork concept and that anyone 
who requested to stay at the plant should be prepared to work under 
this type of system. This undoubtedly created a self-selection pro 
cess among those who requested to stay at the Fiero plant, rather 
than work at the nearby Lake Orion plant. The union leaders who 
chose to go to Orion initially sought to fully replace what they 
saw as a pre-set socio-technical plant design, while the managers 
and union leaders at Fiero were engaged in a deeper, joint-design 
process from the outset.
The greenfleld sites opened on a nonunion basis in the 1970s relied 
on human resource management professionals to provide the input into 
the design of the new work systems. In contrast, the cases hi our panel 
that were most successful in introducing these new concepts involved 
workers and union leaders in early stages of the design and planning 
processes.
Xerox, in 1983, the company decided it needed to build a new 
toner supply plant. Rumors leaked to the union that the company 
planned to build the plant in the South because of lower utility, 
tax, and labor costs. The union leaders questioned management 
about its plans and proposed to work with management to see if 
the plant could be built and operated competitively in the Webster 
manufacturing complex. The company agreed, and a set of workers 
and union representatives were designated to work with manage-
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ment representatives to examine and test new work and machine 
design concepts while union and company representatives began 
negotiations with the local public utility and local government to 
lower energy and tax costs for the new facility. The plant design 
and equipment selected together promised significant productivi 
ty gains and the negotiations with the local government and utili 
ty representatives were successful. The result was that the plant 
was built in the Webster complex at costs and projected produc 
tivity levels equal to or better than the levels forecast for the plant 
if it was relocated in the South.
GM.The most widely publicized joint union-management plant 
design in the GM system involves the new Saturn Division. After 
the company's engineering and financial planners decided in the 
early 1980s that it was unprofitable to try to build a small car in 
the U.S., GM signed import agreements with two Japanese firms. 
In 1983 GM addressed the issue again, but this time invited the 
UAW to participate in the planning process. The result was an 
agreement to build small cars under a new division of GM (Saturn). 
The design principles included in the new agreement provide for: 
(1) operating teams of workers on the shop floor in a single job 
classification; (2) consensus decisionmaking principles throughout 
all levels of the organization; (3) UAW representatives facilitating 
the operating teams and being represented in the management struc 
ture at all levels of the organization from the shop floor to the 
plant management administrative staff, to the "Strategic Advisory 
Committee" which provides the link between the Saturn Division 
and the executives of GM.
While Saturn is the most visible example of new flexible work systems 
in General Motors, the corporation has sought to introduce these con 
cepts in most of its new or newly refurbished plants. To date, over a 
half dozen such facilities are operating effectively. Still, GM's new plants 
have not all been equally successful, or at least have not followed the 
same paths in introducing the new team concepts.
Again, the comparison of the Fiero and Orion plants is instructive. 
General Motors management designed the technology and manufacturing
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plans for the Orion plant around the use of flexible work systems. For 
a variety of reasons, the union was not actively involved in this pro 
cess. Under the national contract, however, management had the right 
to design the plant and start it up with the new work system. After one 
year, management was then responsible for negotiating an initial con 
tract with the local union, in which the job classifications and related 
work system arrangements were negotiable. After a protracted period 
of negotiations and considerable conflict between local union leaders 
and plant managers, a distinctive local agreement was negotiated that 
allowed workers to choose between working under the pay-for- 
knowledge compensation plan and flexible work systems, or under a 
traditional pay system (though still with the requirement of knowing 
a minimum of two jobs in a given area). Thus, instead of a jointly 
developed system, the parties in effect split the difference.
In contrast, local union representatives worked with management to 
design the work system for the Fiero plant. This experience also 
facilitated the development of a broader role for the union in the manage 
ment of the plant. This was all agreed to at Fiero prior to the start-up 
of production, and no deep conflicts between the parties occurred in 
subsequent negotiations or in the administration of the initial agreement.
The differences between the Fiero and Lake Orion cases suggest that 
failure to develop a joint commitment to the design principles prior to 
their implementation will increase the likelihood of conflict and resistance 
to these new forms of work organization and compensation. This is 
especially the case with workers and/or union representatives whose 
prior experiences are limited to the traditional system. Once the new 
system is implemented, however, it represents enough of a structural 
change and it often begins to attract enough supporters that the burden 
of change then falls on those seeking to return to the traditional system.
Retrofitting Existing Facilities
Our cases suggest it is much more difficult to retrofit existing facilities 
with new work systems. Indeed, throughout the U.S. and Canada, there 
are very few cases where the work organization or work rules cover 
ing a complete facility and the complete workforce have been changed 
by way of a cooperative union-management problemsolving process.
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The only case in our panel where a complete shift from a traditional 
work system to a more flexible system occurred was a case where 
management took a long strike and imposed the new system as part of 
the strike settlement.
Boise Cascade. In 1984, after management had made several 
unsuccessful attempts to reach informal agreements with union 
leaders to eliminate what management viewed as an overly rigid 
set of job classifications and work rules, a nine-week strike over 
a new contract occurred in the company's DeRidder mill. This 
was a relatively new mill (opened in 1967) and represented a 
massive billion dollar investment; but it had a poor productivity 
and profitability record. The major issue in the strike was manage 
ment's demand to eliminate the large number of past practices that 
had built up over the years, and to collapse the work organization 
structure down into a small number of job classifications. After 
nine weeks the union accepted management's terms largely in 
response to threats from this high-wage employer that it would 
hire a replacement workforce. The settlement provided for a no- 
layoff guarantee, and a guarantee that no worker would face a pay 
reduction. In fact, a majority of workers received large pay in 
creases as they were transferred to the new pay structure. A year 
and one-half after the end of the strike, the workers voted to con 
tinue the new system. Still, the leadership of the union is in flux 
and plant performance has not shown dramatic improvements. 
Thus, it remains to be seen whether this avenue for innovation 
will be effective and whether it can be sustained. 
This case illustrates that it is very difficult to use a problemsolving 
approach to achieve an immediate and complete change within an ex 
isting facility. The changes that management wanted were just too vast 
for the union to discuss until it had no other choice. It may be that only 
a hard bargaining strategy by management, with a high probability of 
a strike, can achieve wholesale change all at once. Even then, as part 
of the new arrangements, the employment and income security interests 
of the incumbent workforce need to be addressed and the ultimate out 
come remains uncertain.
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Because it is difficult to change the work organization of an entire 
plant all at once, the more typical strategy observed in the panel was 
an incremental process in which natural "opportunities" (threat of job 
loss, prospect of obtaining new investments, etc.) provided the stimulus 
to change. What, then, has been the experience with the incremental 
retrofitting of existing facilities? Here our cases provide much evidence.
Xerox. In 1982, after management announced its intent to con 
tract out wiring harness production, the union persuaded manage 
ment to place the decision on hold and to establish a special study 
team to explore changes in the organization and management of 
the wiring harness unit that would make it cost competitive. The 
team's recommendation cut the costs of production by an estimated 
28 percent, and thereby saved the work. However, these recom 
mendations required changes in the managerial formulas for 
calculating overhead, revising supervisory ratios, and other deci 
sions that had to be made by top management. The changes also 
involved a number of modifications to seniority, job classifica 
tion, transfers, and temporary work. Thus, the task force's recom 
mendations had to be referred to the union and company bargain 
ing committees for approval. Approval was granted as part of the 
1983 contract. In fact the negotiators went an important step fur 
ther by agreeing to use the wiring harness study team concept as 
a model for dealing with uncompetitive operations in the future. 
As noted earlier, employment and income security guarantees for 
incumbent workers were included as part of the agreement. Since 
this agreement, five other study teams have been formed, four 
of which have kept work in-house leading to a range of modifica 
tions in work organization in different areas.
Cummins. Innovation occurred here in response to a management 
announcement that a line responsible for a particular engine was to 
be shut down and moved from the unionized Columbus, Indiana 
plant to the company's newer nonunion plant (one of the most 
highly publicized nonunion team-concept plants opened in the 
1970s) in Jamestown, New York. The Diesel Workers Union asked
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to have an opportunity to save the work. Both parties ultimately 
agreed to a reorganization of the work into fewer job classifica 
tions and other flexible arrangements. This line now operates with 
these new arrangements inside a plant governed by traditional con 
cepts and work rules.
A similar development occurred at the Indianapolis parts center, 
a distribution operation that was scheduled to close. The company 
agreed to keep this work under the jurisdiction of the DWU if 
costs could be brought down to a level competitive with non 
union options. The union agreed to eliminate the multiple job 
classification system and replace it with a single pay grade and 
flexible movement of workers across tasks. These workers earn 
more than do comparable workers in another unionized parts center 
that is organized in a traditional fashion. However, the Indianapolis 
employees also have more duties assigned to them than the 
employees working under the traditional system.
It should be noted that this pay and progression plan had been in 
troduced by management at Cummins in several successive rounds 
of negotiations dating back to 1979. However, each time rank- 
and file opposition kept the union from agreeing to it. Thus this 
case illustrates again how the threat of job loss has been used by 
employers to achieve changes in work rules and work organiza 
tion for specific groups especially in the face of predictable 
general opposition by the workforce.
Just as the threat of job loss has been used to induce changes in work 
organization, so too has the potential for gaining new work or new in 
vestments been used as a lever to introduce changes. In the Xerox toner 
plant example it was the union that took the initiative in getting manage 
ment to consider locating the new plant in Rochester. At Fiero, workers 
knew that if they were not able to assemble the new Fiero sports car 
at low costs, the plant was likely to be permanently closed, as the site 
was too small for other operations. In other cases in our panel, manage 
ment initiated discussions with the union over the possibility of locating 
work in an existing site, or allocating new investments to bargaining 
unit personnel, in return for adopting flexible work organization con 
cepts. We expect this to happen with increasing frequency in the future.
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Introduction of New Technology
The introduction of new technology represents one of the oldest 
avenues for changing industrial relations, since nearly all changes in 
technology have effects on the number, mix, and content of jobs. The 
advances in micro electronics that fuel the current wave of technological 
innovation have these traditional effects. There is a growing consensus 
among technology and work specialists, however, that the specific ef 
fects of these new technologies vary depending on the objectives driv 
ing their use, the means by which new technology is implemented, and 
the links forged between the technology and the human resource/in 
dustrial relations practices of the parties (Walton 1983; Pava 1985; 
Shimada 1986).
The introduction of new technology clearly serves as a major oppor 
tunity for unfreezing existing industrial relations practices and tradi 
tions. We also see it as an extremely powerful avenue for stimulating 
and institutionalizing innovations. At the same time, technological change 
can serve as a major source of conflict, resistance, and struggle for power 
between the parties, since it strikes so deeply and directly at the vital 
interests of the firm, the workforce, and the union.
All of the propositions or principles we suggested involving chang 
ing work organization arrangements apply equally to the introduction 
of new technology. However, two additional propositions are suggested 
by our work in progress with panel members involved in major 
technological innovations. First, when management makes massive in 
vestments in new technologies without consciously and successfully using 
the new investments in order to introduce innovations in industrial rela 
tions practices, it faces a longer learning period for making the 
technology work, greater resistance by employees to the fullest utiliza 
tion of the technology, and less capacity for continuous learning and 
improvement in the performance of the new technology and work system. 
Second, technology strategies that fully integrate human resource con 
siderations require fundamental and lasting changes in the roles of union 
leaders, workers, and managers, in their relationships, and in the design 
of the organization. Major technological change will inevitably have 
implications for the social side of the organization. If these are not
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addressed directly there will inevitably surface important questions about 
organizational structure and the orientation of employment relations. 
We will draw on work under way at two panel firms to illustrate these 
points: GM and Boeing.
The joint venture between GM and Toyota at New United Motors 
Manufacturing Incorporated (NUMMI) in Fremont, California provides 
a good deal of evidence regarding how effective integration of technology 
and human resource management and organization design principles 
can improve industrial relations and organization performance. The 
NUMMI experiment also illustrates how the concept of technology must 
itself be broadened to encompass the total array of organization design 
and human resource management principles and practices. The NUM 
MI plant relies on principles of high worker motivation, organizational 
learning, flexible job and work organization, advanced inventory and 
quality control, and employment security, many of which were first 
introduced in Europe by socio-technical design theorists (Trist 1982) 
and now are being adopted in varying degrees by an increasing number 
of American firms and unions (Shimada and MacDuffie 1987).
NUMMI. The central feature of the production system used at 
NUMMI is its deep dependence on achieving effective performance 
via the human resource management system. It cannot work unless 
workers have the proper skills, training, and motivation. Thus, 
Shimada and MacDuffie argue that achieving and sustaining these 
human resource outcomes is a necessary condition in order for 
the just-in-time inventory system, the introduction of quality con 
trol into production jobs, the flexible system of work organiza 
tion, and the related organization design and hardware features of 
this production system to produce high quality goods at low costs.
While there has been no comprehensive quantitative comparison 
of the performance of this plant with other auto plants in the U.S., 
there are enough preliminary quantitative and qualitative data to 
suggest that it is performing well on quality and cost criteria. It 
has continued to be evaluated favorably by the workers, union 
leaders, and managers involved. One study shows, for example, 
that the plant's productivity and quality performance exceeds the
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performance levels of a traditionally structured plant with a tradi 
tional union-management relationship, and is generally comparable 
to the quality and productivity levels found in Toyota's major pro 
duction facility in Japan (Krafcik 1986). Moreover, UAW and GM 
management both continue to stress the importance of learning 
from the NUMMI experiment when introducing new technology 
and changing work organization practices in other facilities.
Boeing. In 1983 Boeing and the IAM included a New Technology 
clause in their collective bargaining agreement, which provided 
for periodic management briefings about plans for new technology 
and established a Joint Training Advisory Committee (JTAC) to 
oversee training and retraining of employees affected by new 
technology. In the 1986 contract negotiations, the parties took 
another step toward a joint approach to planning for and manag 
ing the introduction of technological change by establishing a Pilot 
Project on New Technology Committee (PPC). This joint com 
mittee is charged with the responsibility of designing, implement 
ing and evaluating experimental projects involving new technology 
and new work organization arrangements. It represents another 
example of the use of collective bargaining process to endorse and 
sanction problemsolving and joint planning principles on a project- 
by-project basis where opportunities for new approaches arise. 
While it is too early to evaluate this new agreement, it does pro 
vide the protective language and the joint commitment needed not 
only for the initial experiments to be conducted but for the parties 
to learn from these experiments and to diffuse the experience and 
knowledge gained from them to other parts of the organization. 
The NUMMI experience is made especially significant when com 
pared to the approach to introducing new technology typically follow 
ed by American firms. Technology is usually seen as a deterministic 
factor to be purchased or developed and implemented by management 
and technical engineering experts. Even companies that emphasize par 
ticipative principles on a wide range of other issues often fall back into 
the traditional stance of viewing technology as fixed and relegate 
organizational and human resource issues to a secondary status
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(Goodman et al. 1986). At Boeing, even though considerable progress 
has been made in giving the union access to information on technology 
at the strategic level, to date the implementation process at the workplace 
has followed a fairly traditional form. Labor-management deliberations 
have focused primarily on the consequences of new technology and not 
on issues of design. The new technology language introduced in the 
1986 labor agreements at Boeing represent the parties' determination 
to break out of this traditional pattern.
Union Participation in Strategic Management Decisions
In the examples discussed so far in this report we have focused on 
changes initiated at either the workplace or the collective bargaining 
levels of the labor-management relationship. We have followed the ex 
tent to which the changes have broadened and deepened the union's 
role in areas of decisionmaking that have traditionally been reserved 
to management. We have also seen how the union's role can be even 
further circumscribed by unilateral management decisions. One of our 
central propositions is that broader and deeper union roles at the strategic 
level of management decisionmaking are necessary if the innovations 
in employee participation, work reorganization, and introduction of new 
technologies and work systems are to be sustained over time.
At the same time, we have found that participation at the strategic 
level must not only help produce tangible economic benefits for the 
employees and the firm, but must be accompanied by active communica 
tions, education, and participation efforts at the workplace level. This 
is because workers will not support representation or participation in 
managerial decisionmaking as a right or a matter of principle. Instead, 
the majority of workers show little interest in representation at this level 
of decisionmaking unless and until they see the links between decisions 
made at this level and their own long-term economic welfare and securi 
ty, as well as with their everyday work experiences. When these links 
are made, however, worker interest may well increase, and the prob 
ability that support for this type of representation and involvement
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will be sustained over time may also increase. Our case study at Western 
Airlines (Wever 1987) illustrates these points.
Western. In collective bargaining in 1983 and again in 1984, the 
four major unions representing employees at Western Airlines made 
wage and work rule concessions, and in return were granted 
(1) four seats on the company's board of directors, (2) a profit- 
sharing plan, and (3) an employee stock ownership plan. These 
concessions and the quid pro quos were in effect when Western 
reached an agreement to merge with Delta Airlines in September, 
1986. As a result of the merger, Western employees were to be 
absorbed into the Delta workforce. Since only the pilots at Delta 
are unionized (and are part of the Airline Pilots Association, as 
are the Western pilots), all other employees would lose their union 
representation unless their unions won a representation election 
involving all of the Delta and Western employees in their respec 
tive bargaining units.
Survey data collected from Western employees about one year prior 
to the merger demonstrated quite clearly that these employees 
evaluated board representation (and other quid pro quos) primarily 
on the basis of their economic effects. Employees were asked to 
indicate which of the quid pro quos they valued most: (1) board 
membership, (2) stock ownership, (3) profit sharing, or 
(4) employee involvement at the workplace. The clearest survey 
result was that employees valued board membership the least of 
all these options. Employee involvement at the workplace was given 
a higher priority than board membership. Profit sharing and stock 
ownership were valued even higher than employee involvement, 
suggesting that employees were most interested in using these new 
compensation arrangements to recover the wage concessions.
The merger with Delta does appear to enhance the security of the 
jobs of Western employees. In addition, our calculations of the 
effects of the profit sharing and the stock ownership provisions 
suggests that the average Western employee would recoup bet 
ween 75 percent and 90 percent of the wage concessions made 
in 1983 and 1984. At the same time, our case study evidence
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suggests that the union representatives on the board had little signif 
icant influence over the merger negotiations or the terms of the 
merger agreement, or over other basic strategic business decisions 
of Western. Thus, this case produced mixed results. The existence 
of profit sharing and stock ownership did help employees recoup 
a substantial portion of their economic concessions, while the 
merger bolstered their employment security. However, all but one 
of the unions would lose their representational status in the merger 
and that all employees would lose representation in strategic 
management decisionmaking. Thus, in this case involvement in 
strategic decisionmaking was only a short-run quid pro quo that 
was not sustained through the change in ownership. 
Board representation is only the most visible and formal type of par 
ticipation in strategic decisionmaking found in our panel. More frequent 
forms of such participation are ones that evolve incrementally as 
workplace participation processes expand and top union-management 
steering committees are established, or as part of work organization 
reforms, or when decisions to make major new investments or 
technological changes require agreements between top-level union and 
management leaders. These opportunities for innovations make it 
necessary for union and management decisionmakers to choose between 
expanding the scope of participation and joint decisionmaking, and 
thereby sustaining the innovation process, or limiting its scope and often 
its momentum. Several examples from the panel illustrate this point. 
Examples of involvement in strategic decisionmaking that evolve in 
crementally, as expansions of innovations begun at lower levels of the 
bargaining relationship, include the participation of UAW representatives 
on the plant manager's steering committee at GM's Fiero plant, and 
the participation of ACTWU representatives on Xerox's human resource 
strategic planning teams and in the design of the work system and cost 
analysis of the new toner plant. These and other examples noted earlier 
suggest that the "bottom-up" incremental expansions of participation 
are more likely than formal provisions for board representation to achieve 
the types of linkages among workplace, collective bargaining, and 
strategic interactions that we believe are essential in sustaining strategic 
level participation.
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Strategic participation represents a fundamental departure from tradi 
tional U.S. industrial relations policy and practice, however. It requires 
that management accept the union in the organization, and that both 
parties (and ultimately policy makers) agree on the broader roles of the 
union. Unless management is prepared to strengthen the role and status 
of the union, and unless union leaders are prepared to break from their 
traditional stance of leaving the task of managing to management, 
strategic participation is unlikely to be initiated or sustained. Because 
of the important conditions necessary for management and union leaders 
to accept this innovation, we do not see this type of innovation diffus 
ing to a broad range of settings unless major changes in public policy 
reinforce changes in the values and strategies of both management and 
labor. We also believe a broader and deeper role for worker represen 
tation at this level is absolutely needed to sustain, diffuse, and even 
tually institutionalize the other innovations discussed in this paper.
Institutionalization of Innovations Within the Panel Sites
The diversity of situations faced by the parties in the sites studied 
in this research preclude simple comparisons. Yet we can use the com 
parative experiences of the cases to summarize a number of the key 
lessons they offer about the conditions that facilitate institutionaliza- 
tion of changes within bargaining relationships that have initiated in 
novations. We must also be careful, however, to avoid over-generalizing 
from the select and limited sample upon which we have drawn these 
observations. Therefore, the following summary statements might bet 
ter be interpeted as hypotheses worth testing in future research or against 
the personal experiences of labor and management leaders engaged in 
similar activities.
While we have discussed participation, work reorganization, 
technological change, and union participation in strategic management 
decisionmaking as discreet starting points for industrial relations innova 
tions, it is clear that none of these can survive over time independent 
of others. Instead, when combined in ways suited to particular settings, 
they offer a higher probability of being institutionalized in on-
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going practices. Indeed,when the full range of innovations discussed 
here are integrated in a single bargaining relationship, they produce 
a system of industrial relations that is fundamentally different from the 
traditional New Deal model.
For example, a more complete transformation of practice has occur 
red at Xerox and Fiero than at the other sites in the panel because the 
parties in th£se two cases have introduced innovations at all levels of 
industrial relations that reinforce and help sustain each other. At Xerox, 
participation and problemsolving are used not only at the workplace 
as part of an ongoing QWL process, but to adapt work organization 
practices, to plan for how to use new technology, to explore oppor 
tunities for enhancing employment security, to design a gain-sharing 
system, and for union-management consultation over longer-term plans 
and business prospects. At Fiero, the principles of participation and 
flexibility have been integral parts of the overall design and day-to-day 
management of the facility from the start. Thus, because of the in 
terdependence among these innovations, we believe these parties have 
gone farther toward a transformation of the overall system of industrial 
relations governing their relationships and have a higher probability of 
institutionalizing these innovations as ongoing industrial relations 
practices.
We only see a continuous commitment to grappling with these issues 
in a handful of cases. Instead, we mostly observe significant changes 
in a limited subset of activities. In some cases, such as Boeing, Budd, 
Goodyear, and Alcoa, the parties appear to be searching for strategies 
to continue the momentum established to date. They are broadening 
the scope of their innovations in ways needed to reinforce and sustain 
those already initiated. At Boise Cascade, the changes were introduc 
ed as a one-time event, incorporated into the labor contract, and have 
remained in place. At Cummins there has been a reversal of some of 
the initial changes as a result of conflict that occurred between manage 
ment and the unions over recent layoffs, recent shifts in business strategy, 
and changes in top management personnel. Thus, a wide spectrum ex 
ists within our panel sites with respect to the degree to which these in 
novations have been institutionalized and their prospects for further 
transformation of traditional practices.
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Strategies for Diffusion
A key conclusion that can be drawn from the cases reviewed above 
is that the institutionalization process involves incrementally overcom 
ing or coping with the various internal contradictions that block innova 
tion at all three levels of the labor-management relationship. Only a 
subset of the population of current bargaining relationships across the 
United States fits this description, however. Innovation is still concen 
trated in relationships where the parties have experienced sufficient 
economic pressures to adapt, and where management lacks viable alter 
natives to improving its competitive position without working with the 
union. Thus, we face a major constraint on the diffusion of these in 
novations to broader settings, viz., the fact that in the majority of employ 
ment relationships in the U.S., management attempts to avoid unioniza 
tion or to limit the scope and influence of their unions.
We now turn to a discussion of the strategies of American manage 
ment, union, and government leaders, to identify the factors that will 
help decide whether these innovations will diffuse, or whether they will 
remain limited to a relatively small subset of bargaining relationships.
Management Strategies and Choices
The diffusion of innovations in industrial relations will be vitally af 
fected by the values that govern management policies and by the business 
and technology strategies management chooses to remain competitive.
Management Values. In unionized settings, innovation depends on 
management's acceptance of a role for unions at the workplace and in 
managerial decisionmaking. This is essential if management is to at 
tain a shared commitment to improving the organization's com 
petitiveness. Yet the opposition to unions and expanded union influence 
lies so deep within the value system of the majority of American 
managers that it has become a major barrier to the diffusion of industrial 
relations innovations.
Efforts to unionize new groups of employees will be highly contested 
adversarial processes. If the present trends continue, unions will lose 
a majority of these elections and probably become more frustrated wim 
the current procedures. This will reinforce the insecurity and hostility
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that has come to characterize the national labor-management climate 
in recent years. It will make it more difficult for those union leaders 
who promote innovations and cooperation at the workplace to win in 
ternal political battles over these innovations. In those cases where unions 
do win representation elections, adversarial recognition processes will 
become adversarial bargaining relationships that will not be conducive 
to the trust, flexibility, and participative union-management relations 
required for the institutionalization of innovations.
Thus, American management faces a clear strategic choice. It can 
continue to take advantage of its current power and influence, thereby 
maintaining its traditional opposition to union representation of its 
workforce. This will make innovation problematic with existing unions. 
In effect, those managers facing strong, stable unions suffer at the hands 
of their associates. Alternately, management can join union represen 
tatives so as to negotiate various forms of worker representation that 
suit the needs of firms, as well as the needs of unions and the 
employees/members.
We do not expect a significant shift in managerial values to take place. 
What we do wish to emphasize here is that collectively, American 
management has a stake in diffusing innovations. At a macro level, 
management has an interest in ensuring that actions by any individual 
management representatives at the level of a firm or a single plant do 
not chill the environment for innovation in other organizations.
National networks of executives, who have seen the benefits of sus 
tained innovation and who have a significant economic stake in the con 
tinuity of these innovations, need to be encouraged along these lines. 
These executives need to play a visible and active leadership role in 
promoting discussions over the role of unions in society and the types 
of union-management relationships that are essential to the long-run com 
petitiveness of American industry. They need to work to educate their 
peers on the costs of union avoidance to the overall national labor- 
management climate.
Business Strategies. Not all business strategies are equally compati 
ble with creating and sustaining innovations in industrial relations. The 
stability provided by collective bargaining under the New Deal industrial 
relations model rested on the ability of unions to limit management's
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incentives (or ability) to use labor costs as a major source of competitive? 
advantage. Since collective bargaining is no longer able to "take wages 
out of competition" in many industries, managers must now compete 
in settings where labor costs vary. Yet, we believe that attempting to 
compete through low labor costs is, in the end, not a viable option foir 
much of American industry. This path certainly limits the trust, flex 
ibility, and adaptability of workers that are all needed to sustain the 
innovations discussed in this paper.
American management must recognize that in order to sustain and 
diffuse innovations over the long run, it will need to follow competitive 
strategies that meet the income and employment security expectations 
of the American workforce. Business and investment strategies that seek 
to move work in response to short-run variations in labor costs or 
employment standards are only the most visible of a variety of strategies 
that are incompatible with sustaining innovation. There will always be 
environments within or outside the U.S. that offer lower wages and 
employment standards. This business strategy will forever leave the 
American workers insecure, and therefore inflexible. Such a short-run 
strategy will also direct management's attention away from the need 
to develop the comparative advantage American firms can sustain in 
the world market, viz., an advantage built on high technology, skilled 
labor, and flexible production.
Other business strategies that limit trust and flexibility also need to 
be challenged if innovations are to be diffused. The short-run buying 
and selling of productive assets as mere financial instruments applied 
irrespective of employment consequences, has the same chilling effect 
on trust and flexibility. Thus, corporate take-overs or other investment 
strategies that have short or limited time horizons have profound dysfunc 
tional human resource and industrial relations consequences.
Technology Strategies. One of the central lessons American manage 
ment is learning from NUMMI and other Japanese-managed firms in 
the U.S. concerns the technology strategies these companies are using. 
Our discussion of NUMMI relied heavily on Shimada's and MacDuf- 
fie's model of the production system in use in that plant and in many 
other Japanese manufacturing firms. The lesson, however, is 
generalizable to applications of new technology outside of manufactur-
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ing as well. That is, technology strategies that rely on effective use of 
employee motivation, skill, and flexibility are more compatible with 
innovations in industrial relations than are those that try to embody all 
the controls and labor saving features within the hardware itself. These 
technologies also help to institutionalize the associated industrial rela 
tions innovations discussed here.
Strategies and Choices for Union Leaders
A companion paper from our research (McKersie, Cutcher- 
Gershenfeld, and Wever 1987) provides a detailed analysis of how the 
strategies and roles of union leaders at the local and national levels change 
in bargaining relationships that institutionalize these innovations. We 
therefore need only summarize the key roles of top-level union leaders 
in diffusing these innovations.
There are deep divisions of opinion within the leadership ranks of 
the labor movement over whether to support, oppose or remain neutral 
about many of the innovations discussed here. The American labor move 
ment will very likely experience a prolonged period of internal political 
debate and conflict over these issues. Unless leaders of national unions 
and other top-level leaders in the labor movement adopt innovations 
of this kind as part of their basic strategies for organizing and represent 
ing workers, union leaders at lower levels who support these innova 
tions will lose political battles within their unions. Consequently, the 
diffusion and institutionalization of these innovations will be blocked.
A leadership posture of neutrality or passive acceptance is not enough. 
This approach would only sustain uncertainty and prolong internal con 
flict. Moreover, it would leave employers wondering about how sup 
portive future union leaders would be of such changes. Finally, simple 
passive acceptance would limit labor leaders' ability to shape and in 
fluence the course of innovations and would limit the ability of unions 
to use their support for these ideas in recruiting new union members.
Strategies for Government Officials
We believe that the broad diffusion of these innovations will require 
strong and sustained leadership on the part of national political leaders: 
first, to encourage a positive dialogue between labor and management,
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and then, to adopt the principles embodied in these innovations as a 
conscious and explicit national policy. Such a national policy would 
require comprehensive review and updating of both the specific labor 
laws that govern union-management relations and the array of economic, 
trade, regulatory, and employment and training policies that influence 
employment relationship.
Some positive steps in this direction are already being taken at the 
national and state levels of government and within a variety of public 
and private groups that are studying ways to enhance the competitiveness 
of the American economy. For example, the Labor Department recently 
issued a discussion paper asking for further analysis of the fit between 
current labor law and the objective of promoting greater cooperation 
(Schlossberg and Fetter 1986). This coincides with a growing consen 
sus within the academic community that serious flaws exist inthe con 
tent and administration of the National Labor Relations Act that im 
pede workers from exercising their rights in union organizing drives 
and discourage labor and management from adopting many of the in 
novations discussed in this report (Getman, Goldberg, and Herman 1976; 
Dickens 1983; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Weiler 1984; Cooke 1985; 
Koch an, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Morris 1987). This dialogue must 
continue and be translated into concrete proposals for updating labor 
law to fit the contemporary environment.
The efforts of the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Management 
Relations and Cooperative Programs to promote research and disseminate 
information on innovations in industrial relations have also helped to 
bring the changes hi industrial relations practices to a broad range of 
practitioners. The network established through the Labor Department's 
support of this research has served a diffusing role as the parties in 
teracted and learned from each other's experiences. The development 
of more and larger networks such as these should continue to pay 
dividends for the Labor Department and the economy.
Updating labor policy will also require greater integration of labor- 
management relations with other dimensions of our national human 
resource and economic policies. In this paper, we have emphasized the 
importance of cooperation, flexibility in human resource management, 
compensation and employment security, and long-run business strategies
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within individual firms. The same need exists for coordination and in 
tegration of public policies affecting these activities and outcomes, the 
1987 report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Ad 
justment and Worker Dislocation is a good example of a tripartite ef 
fort to reach a consensus on a national policy for helping workers and 
firms adjust to economic and technological changes. The involvement 
of labor, business, and government representatives in the development 
of this policy not only helped to build a stronger link between public 
policy and private practice but it also served as a model for making 
progress on a controversial labor policy issue by involving the parties 
hi intensive negotiations and consensus building.
There is also an opportunity to take advantage of the growing con 
sensus among public officials, business and labor leaders, and academic 
experts on the need to develop a long-run strategy for improving the 
competitiveness of American firms in world markets and reducing our 
trade deficits. We believe that diffusing and institutionalizing the in 
dustrial relations innovations discussed here will be critical to the suc 
cess of these efforts and should, therefore, be integrated into these 
strategy discussions.
We can make this final point by way of a historical analogy. Collec 
tive bargaining only diffused and became institutionalized as a stable 
institution in American society after the private experiments of unions 
and employers in the clothing, skilled trades, railroad, and other in 
dustries were adopted as the basic public policy of this country in the 
Railway Labor Act and the Wagner Act. The diffusion of collective 
bargaining was then bolstered with the support of the National Labor 
Relations Board and the War Labor Board. Macroeconomic policies 
that linked economic expansion and improved standards of living fur 
ther assured the centrality of collective bargaining. Public policy will 
need to play a similar institutionalizing role if the innovative practices 
that management and labor have experimented with in selected private 
settings during the first half of the 1980s are to be sustained and diffus 
ed to broader settings in the years ahead.
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